Consistently libertarian Eugene Volokh, who Glenn Reynolds used to suggest should be a Supreme Court nominee, weighs in on the right to bear arms at protests, by excerpting recent decisions. In the first case he quotes both the ruling and the dissent.
6 comments:
The quotation of the statute in the opinion makes it sound like 'demonstration' is being used as a kinder gentler synonym for 'riot', especially the section where the participants are to be informed that the statute is being invoked. So a peaceable assembly with weapons is ok but once violence erupts those with weapons should leave the area.
The dissent seems to play fast and loose with the context of the quoted regulations. I can see why in the early tears of our country it would have been advisable to command the bearing of arms in places where they normally wouldn't be brought in times of potential attack. I doubt they were being carried for use against otger participants in those gatherings
Before reading Christopher B.'s comment I was also going to mention that Agee's dissent in Kipke is disingenuously failing to distinguish between regular assemblies and demonstrations.
I used to find the comments at Voloch rewarding to read, but am once again reminded that it's now full of people without the reading comprehension to distinguish between description of what the current interpretation IS vs advocacy for what the interpretation SHOULD BE.
That's funny, I thought the dissent was spot on and the majority opinion was disingenuously asserting that a peaceable assembly to petition the government for grievances is essentially a riot in embryo.
I don't see what is disingenuous about recognizing any gathering has the potential to become violent unless somebody, ideally the folks doing the organizing or the participants themselves spontaneously, makes sure it doesn't happen. How many sports celebrations have included random acts of vandalism?
Similarly, there is a big difference between 'you may' and 'you shall'.
And I don't see what is supposed to be disingenuous about "failing" to make a distinction that isn't relevant to the exercise of rights. Reading the riot act is no small thing, and when the riot act is read, everyone is ordered to disburse, not just those who are armed. There's no such thing as a semi-riot where the armed people have to leave but everyone else can stay and engage in a little looting and arson as long as they keep it mostly peaceful.
BTW if you think violence is super-rare at sports celebrations, you are strangely misinformed.
"Justices of the Peace were entrusted with broad authority to arrest groups of citizens who threatened the peace. One action that was considered to threaten that peace was to show armor—in other words, showing an intention, or 'at least an apparent tendency,' to engage in violence."
So in the spirit of laws that are in the 'custom and traditions of America,' this one isn't quite. However, it is definitely in the customs and traditions of the English law out of which ours grew. Armor was actually more highly regulated than arms in Medieval England; as Lord Blackstone's commentary points out, a gentleman was 'one qui arma geris,' meaning, 'one who bears arms' -- but in the sense of heraldic arms, which symbolized individuals licensed by the crown to wear armor.
Commoners could be armed with swords and were sometimes required to keep longbows, and of course the quarterstaff was an old English tradition. Armor, however, was regulated to the individuals that had the special trust and confidence of the king, and to their descendants subject to the king's continued approval.
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