This has already joined Souls on Fire, Nine Nations of North
America and Albion’s Seed as books which changed my entire framework for
viewing things
Mann’s earlier book, 1491, upended much of what is commonly
taught about the Americas before the arrival of Columbus. I had known some of it; there was more I
should have put together from pieces I did know; much was entirely new. Short version: the effect of European diseases
on the Native Americans, particularly in the areas settled by the Spanish and
Portuguese, was far more profound than anything we had been taught in school.
They wiped out 90%, perhaps even 95%, of the population. Secondly, we continue to discover entire
civilisations that were unheard of even a few decades ago, in the Andes, in the
Amazon, in Mexico. I reviewed it a few years ago, and followed up on that last year.
But upending pre-Colombian understanding is a smallish
thing. Few of us speak much of that, or
connect it to our own history, physical or intellectual. The history of the
world after 1500, especially in Europe and North America, is part of our
intellectual furniture. It includes much that we use to define ourselves, our
culture, and our enemies. We discuss
ourselves in a world connected to Martin Luther, Queen Elizabeth, Thomas
Jefferson, and Isaac Newton. Battles,
royal successions, great thinkers, scientific advances – these are the
influences that made our world.
Right?
Mann would rate their influence far lower, seeing them as
riding atop deep currents that drove the actions of leaders. From the moment the Columbian Exchange
started in 1492, it changed the world.
Silver – vast piles of it from Potosi, far and away the richest city in
the world. Had you heard of it? Me neither. It was in in the Andes, and its
hiccoughs brought down the Ming empire in China and bankrupted Spain - the two most powerful entities in the world. Now unremembered. Mosquitos – and the
differences among them – may have fueled most of the African slave trade and
drawn our Mason-Dixon line for us, as well as extending a one-year Civil War on
for four years. Potatoes and sweet
potatoes, tobacco, guano, beer and wine, horses, epidemics – these were the
main players on the stage, driving the human decisions in ways we still have
difficulty understanding. Our actions did not mean nothing, but neither were
individuals of much influence, save by accident.
It upends everything you thought you knew. You will never read world history from 1500,
including the parts you thought you knew well, in the same way again. It does not contradict what was known before
so much as swamps it in newer, larger concepts.
Time and again I nodded to myself “I knew that. Why did I not make the connection?” It is strong evidence of the ability of narrative
(as well as counternarrative and amendments) to channel our thought.
What you know is still there, just pushed a few rows back.
Northwest Europe colonised the world and became rich because of a few crops
which allowed it to eliminate years of complete famine. That changed trade,
acquisition, science, mortality, weaponry. That may be most of history. Is that
an oversimplification and a bit of a stretch?
Absolutely. Does it make as least
as much sense as my previous understanding?
Probably.
Mann himself says "...any general history of Europe without an entry in its index for S tuberosum should be ignored." So there.
People interested in environmental issues will have much to
consider as well. Mann declares that
both the catastrophists and the free marketers are right, and provides a lot of
information either could use to advance their arguments. He concludes that the unregulated exchange
and the free movement of goods across the world has indeed made humanity much
more prosperous. But it has also caused
famines, epidemics, wars, and other suffering.
For those who worry that intensive agricultural practices might cause
ecological collapse, Mann would say it already has. Lots of times. Yet he also gives evidence that it has fed the
world, brought huge swaths of humanity into comfortable existences undreamed of
before, and improved our cooperation and goodwill. Both are true. We won’t be able to keep our old assurances
quite intact, none of us. Okay, lots of
us will anyway, because we will only keep the parts we like. Yet I think even the most stubborn and
polarised will pause.
There is also a lot here for those who wish to understand
how the Far Eastern trade 1500-1900, both with Europe and the west coast of
South America, connects with events we are more familiar with.
